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CONTRACTS FUNDING AND I 
MORTGAGE EXCHANGE I 
a Utah Corporation, 1 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
vs. I 
BOARD OF SALT LAKE / 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, / 
Defendant and Appellant. P L A I N T I F F S - RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E 
O F T H E CASE 
The Third District Court of Salt Lake County 
ruled that the Salt Lake Planning Commission was 
estopped to deny the right of respondent to construct 
a mobile home park on respondent's property located 
within Salt Lake County. Said Court decreed that the 
respondent had the right to construct said mobile home 
park and the Court directed Darrel D. Maynes, Direc-
tor, Salt Lake County Building and Zoning Enforce-
ment Department, to issue a building permit for the 
construction of a mobile home park on said property. 
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DISPOSITION IN L O W E R C O U R T 
After consolidation of two cases/receiving testi-
mony and evidence, the Court held that a building per-
mit should issue to the respondent since he did have the 
right to construct a mobile home park on his land, said 
land being situated in an unzoned area. 
RELIEF S O U G H T O N APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
judgment and for an order reinstating the decisions of 
the Salt Lake Planning Commission and the Board of 
Salt Lake County Commissioners wherein they denied 
respondent's application for a permit to construct the 
said mobile home park. The appellant is not entitled to 
relief. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
On or about October 17, 1972 the Plaintiff, Con-
tracts Funding and Mortgage Exchange, a Utah Cor-
poration, the respondent herein, contracted to purchase 
45 acres of unzoned land located within the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah. The unzoned land was pur-
chased through a Court supervised estate sale for the 
sum of $168,150.00 with $16,815.00 down and the 
balance of $151,335.00 being paid within six months as 
required by the contract (Exhibit 5-P and 6-P). 
The land remained unzoned until the 24th day of 
August, 1973, at which time it was zoned A-5 by the 
County. 
This case is a consolidation of two cases. The first, 
District Court No. 213811, was an action by the Plain-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
tiff against Darrell D. Maynes, Director, Salt Lake 
County Building and Zoning Enforcement Depart-
ment, for the issuance of a Wri t of Mandamus for his 
failure to issue a building permit on the unzoned land. 
The second, District Court No. 214279, is against the 
Board of Salt Lake County Commissioners and repre-
sents the administrative proceeding of this case. All 
actions by the Plaintiff were taken while the land was 
unzoned with the exception of the second suit, which 
was filed on September 5, 1973. The facts in the sec-
ond case as set forth in the Complaint, and Amended 
Complaint, and referred to hereafter as appropriate, 
are admitted by the appellant. (R-40 and R-43). 
This case requires the construction of three basic 
areas of law; the first, Chapter 27 of Title 17, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended, which will be 
hereinafter referred to as the "Utah Code"; and, two 
portions of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake Coun-
ty, and they are: Mobile Home Park Ordinance con-
sisting of Chapter 3 of Title 2; and the Uniform Zoning 
Ordinance of Salt Lake County made up of all of Title 
22, and will be referred to as the "County Zoning Or-
dinance." 
The Plaintiff had built other mobile home parks 
prior to the one in question. Shortly after the purchase 
of the 45 acres, and before any talk or action in regard 
to rezoning the acreage or any portion thereof, Plain-
tiff went to Director Maynes of the Salt Lake County 
Building and Zoning Enforcement Department to ob-
tain a building permit. Plaintiff was instructed that a 
permit would not issue until a Conditional Use Permit 
was granted and referred Plaintiff to the Salt Lake 
Planning Commission. In the latter part of December, 
1972, or around the first part of January of 1973, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Plaintiff did file an application with that Commission 
for a Conditional Use Permit together with the neces-
sary plans and specifications and other documents re-
quired by Section 4 of the Mobile Home Park Ordin-
ance, said Section setting forth some 50 items to be 
complied with. The application was approved on 
March 13, 1973, following a hearing before the Salt 
Lake Planning Commission, and the Conditional Use 
Permit granted. The Plaintiff then acquired 17 addi-
tional acres of property located in the City of West Jor-
dan. (R-5) Said acreage being already zoned for a 
mobile home park. (R-5) The Commission's planning 
staff set the matter for a new hearing on March 27, 
without the Planning Commissoin withdrawing, can-
celling or otherwise modifying its decision granting a 
Conditional Use Permit two weeks prior thereto on 
March 13th. Following the hearing on March 27, the 
Commission denied the Conditional Use Permit. No 
written reasons were set forth although Section 7 of the 
Mobile Home Ordinance requres that in the event of 
disapproval the Commission shall set forth the reason 
therefore. 
An Appeal was taken from the action of the Plan-
ning Commission to the Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, and a hearing was held on the Appeal 
on April 12, 1973. The Board of County Commission-
ers did not act thereon until August 8, 1973, at which 
time the Appeal was denied. A period of almost 4 
months had expired between the hearing and the denial 
notwithstanding that the County Zoning Ordinance in 
Section 2 (6) (b) specifically requires the Board of 
Commissioners to act within 7 days after the hearing 
date of such an Appeal by affirming, reversing, altering 
or recommending further review of the decision by the 
Planning Commission. 
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Again, on August 7, 1973, the Plaintiff demanded 
of Director Maynes that a Building Permit be issued 
on the unzoned land, but the Director again refused. 
(Exhibit 3-P) The suit against Director Maynes 
praying for a Wri t of Mandamus was then filed on 
August 10, 1973. 
Plaintiff purchased the land intending to use the 
same for a mobile park, and even prior to the purchase 
had made inquiries about the use of unzoned land for 
purpose of a mobile home park. He had talked with 
one of the Salt Lake County Commissioners and was 
informed that a mobile home park could be put upon 
unzoned land. (R-6) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T 1 
L O W E R COURT DID N O T ERR IN FINDING 
T H A T T H E PLANNING COMMISSION A N D 
T H E PLANNING STAFF ACTED IMPROPER-
LY A N D UNLAWFULLY IN GIVING N O T I C E 
O F A RE-HEARING ON PLAINTIFF 'S APPLI-
CATION AND IN HOLDING T H E RE-HEAR-
ING ON MARCH 27, 1973, AND DENYING 
T H E CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT ON APRIL 
6, 1973 
As noted, the appellant admits the allegations of 
the Complaint in the second suit against the Board of 
Salt Lake County Commissioners. A public hearing 
was held on March 13, 1973. The staff on its own 
initiative, without any official or proper action to with-
draw, cancel or otherwise modify the approval granted 
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on March 13, and without official or proper order 
directing a new hearing, did set the matter down for 
hearing again on March 27, 1973, Further, following 
the second hearing, the Commission did not comply 
with Section 7 of the Mobile Home Park Ordinance 
which requires in the event of a disapproval the reasons 
therefore shall be set forth and reads as follows: 
After the consideration and action of the 
Planning Commission, the Zoning Administra-
tor shall give the applicant written notification 
of the decision. Copies of such notification shall 
be forwarded to the Board of Health and the 
Building Inspection Department and in the event 
of disapproval shall set forth the reasons there-
fore, (Underscoring added) 
The County Commission, like any administrative 
agency, is subject to the requirements of administrative 
procedural due process, the elements of which are lack-
ing in the proceedings of this case. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Administrative Law Section 353, Page 166. 
The County's position on this point assumes the 
validity of its argument in Point III, that is, that the 
land was subject to the Plaintiff obtaining a conditional 
use permit. In the absence of that requirement, there 
would not be a case before the court. However, the 
County's insistence that the requirement be met has 
prohibited the Plaintiff, as well as the Planning Com-
mission, from going ahead with reports from other 
departments and agencies as provided in the Mobile 
Home Park Ordinance. Further, in the absence of such 
a requirement, there would be no duty upon the Plan-
ning Commission to give residents located within 300 
feet of the applicant's property a notice of hearing. 
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As set forth in the Plaintiff's Point III, there was 
no requirement for the Plaintiff to obtain a conditional 
use permit on the unzoned land of the Plaintiff• 
P O I N T II 
T H E L O W E R C O U R T DID N O T ERR IN F IND-
ING AND CONCLUDING T H A T RESPOND-
E N T RELIED T O ITS D E T R I M E N T ON T H E 
PLANNING C O M M I S S I O N S ACT O F MARCH 
13,1973. 
The Lower Court's Finding of Fact No. 6 is sup-
ported. Paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint is ad-
mitted and reads as follows: 
That the Plaintiff relying on the approval of 
the Planning Commission expended large sums 
of money and further obligated itself to purchase 
17 additional acres of land which adjoined the 
said 45 acres of land but which 17 acres of land 
are situate in the city of West Jordan and are 
zoned for mobile home use. That the plans of 
the Plaintiff were and are for development of 
the entire tract, consisting of the 17 acres in 
West Jordan and the 45 acres in Salt Lake 
County, of 62 acres to be developed as one unit. 
There is no allegation that a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract was entered into on that date, but only that the 
Plaintiff obligated itself to purchase the 17 acres, and 
it did so in reliance on the approval of the Planning 
Commission in granting a conditional use. While the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract is dated the .... day of 
June, 1973, this does not mean, in contravention to the 
admitted facts set forth in Paragraph 20 of the Com-
plaint, that there was no other contract or preliminary 
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contract between the parteis existing during the period 
of time when the Plaintiff, as alleged, acted in reliance 
on the action of the Planning Commission. Preliminary 
contracts between parties such as Earnest Money Re-
ceipt And Offer To Purchase is uncommon in Utah 
particularly where a Uniform Real Estate Contract is 
involved, the latter document merging prior agree-
ments. 
Also, the plans for the development of a mobile 
home park included the 17 acres, and the development 
was based on the total acreage. These plans were filed 
with the County prior to the hearing before the Plan-
ning Commission. It would not therefore be unusual 
for the Plaintiff to consummate its proposed and in-
tended purchase when the County Planning Commis-
sion gave approval for a conditional use permit. 
The case of Gibbons and Reed v. North Salt Lake, 
19 U. 2d, 329, 431 P. 2d 559 (1967) is not of the same 
factual situation as the present case, and this Court 
made it clear in its decision that each case must be ex-
amined on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 
However, the rational of the Gibbons and Reed case 
influenced the Lower Court in the present case, and 
correctly so. In the Gibbons and Reed case there was a 
prior non-conforming use, and in the present case there 
was no restriction of use whatsoever. In that regard the 
present case is stronger since, as stated by the Court, 
there is a tendency to phase out nonconforming uses. 
In both cases there is a reliance. In the Gibbons and 
Reed case the Court did state: 
". . . W e hesitate to hold the provisions of 
the ordinance completely invalid as they might 
apply to other fact situations since this excava-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion ordinance illustrates an example where it is 
impossible or impractical to lay down the stand-
ards without destroying flexibility necessary to 
enable the town to carry out the legislative in-
tent/ ' 
In the present case we have a building and licensing 
statute involved with the County Zoning Ordinance, 
The Lower Court in the present case determined it was 
not necessary to hold the provisions of either ordinance 
unconstitutional as was done by the Lower Court in the 
Gibbons and Reed case. The Lower Court in the pres-
ent case adopting the procedure which in effect makes 
the conditional use requirements of the Mobile Home 
Ordinance as well as the County Zoning Ordinance un-
enforceable as against the Plaintiff. In view of the fact 
that the land involved is or was one of the last few por-
tions of Salt Lake County to be zoned into districts, the 
decision of the Lower Court falls well within the ra-
tional of the Gibbons and Reed case. 
The case of Price v. SchwafeL 92 Ca. App. 2d 77, 
206 P. 2d 683, (1949), cited by the appellant, acknowl-
edges the right of the appellant to a building permit 
during the interim zoning period at page 688: 
". . . if an application for a building permit 
accompanied by the proper plans and other data 
had been made during that interim there is no 
question but that appellants would have been 
entitled to the permit under the existing 'interim' 
ordinance. But appellants waited until the ordi-
nance was in process of repeal and filed their 
application too late to permit respondent to make 
necessary investigation regarding the plans of 
the building proposed to be erected. 
The reverse is true in the case before the Court. When 
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the Plaintiff first asked for a building permit, the Coun-
ty refused. Instead, the County gave out erroneous 
information as to the law and required a conditional 
use permit. This sent the Plaintiff to the Planning 
Commission with the eventual zoning of the land in 
question approximately three quarters of a year after 
the first application for a building permit was made. 
P O I N T III 
T H E L O W E R C O U R T DID N O T ERR IN 
F INDING T H A T PLAINTIFF W O U L D N O T 
H A V E BEEN REQUIRED T O OBTAIN A C O N -
DITIONAL USE P E R M I T 
It is admitted by the Appellant in its brief on page 
15 that the Mobile Home Park Ordinance is not a part 
of the zoning ordinance. It is a building and licensing 
ordinance. The county has the power to make zoning 
county-wide, but in the absence thereof, it is limited to 
district zoning. This limitation is clearly spelled out in 
the last sentence of Section 17-27-11, Utah Code: 
". . . . Zoning, unless county-wide, shall be 
limited to districts established by the Board of 
' C o u n t y Commissioners, either on petition as 
herein before (hereinafter) provided or by direct 
, / , action as hereinbefore provided/' (Emphasis 
added) 
This same section authorizes the Board of County 
Commissioners, after the County Planning Commission 
has certified a plan or plans for zoning incorporated 
territory in the county and prepared plans together
 # 
with zoning resolution and maps, and after a public 
hearing thereon, to: 
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". . . divide the territory of the county which 
lies outside the cities and towns into districts and 
zones of such number, shape or area as it may 
determine, and within such districts may regu-
late the erection, construction, alteration and 
uses of buildings and structures and uses of 
land- • . ." (Emphasis added) 
The land in this case was unzoned. The County Com-
mission never created a district or zone which covered 
the land, and therefore the land was not subject to any 
use restriction as is land located in a district or zone 
created by the Board of County Commissioners, until 
August 24, 1974. 
The county claims that the County Zoning Ordin-
ance comes into play by virtue of Mobile Home Park 
Ordinance and particularly Sub-section (2) of Section 
1 which states: 
"Conditional Use. A use of land for which a 
conditional use permit is required pursuant to 
Title 22, Chapter 3 1 . . . ." 
However, this Sub-section, or ordinance for that mat-
ter, did not confer any additional power upon the Plan-
ning Commission nor did it bring unzoned land under 
the jurisdiction of the Planning Commission. It only 
affected the land situate in districts created by the 
County Commission. This construction is borne out by 
examining the County Zone Ordinance. When we 
examine Chapter 31 referred to, we read: 
"A conditional use permit shall be required 
by all uses listed as conditional uses in the 
district regulations or elsewhere in this title. . . / ' 
(Emphasis added) 
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And again, in Sub-section (5) of the same Section 2: 
(5) ''Determination. The Planning Com-
mission may permit a conditional use to be lo-
cated within any district in which the particular 
conditional use is permitted by the use regula-
tions of this title/' (Emphasis added) 
An examination of Title 22, which is the County Zon-
ing Ordinance, shows that there are 24 different zones 
set up, a chapter being devoted to each zone. The first 
three sections of each chapter designate purpose, "Per-
mitted Uses/ ' and "Conditional Uses/ ' For instance 
Chapter 30 thereof is entitled Manufacturing Zone, 
M-2, and it has as its purpose to provide for heavy 
industrial uses. There are 56 permitted uses and 25 
conditional uses, including the use for gravel pits, 
quarries and rock crushing. Mobile home parks are 
found in Chapters 21 and 22 only as "Conditional 
Uses." The County Zoning Ordinance also establishes 
22 districts all located within one or more of the 24 
zones. The power of the Planning Commission and the 
right to regulate the uses of land is limited to districts 
and zones, and the intention of the legislature to so 
limit the power of the Planning Commission is clearly 
set forth in Section 17-27-9 of the Utah Code where 
the Planning Commission is authorized to make certain 
recommendations to regulate districts or zones includ-
ing the uses of land and submit the same to the Board 
of County Commissioners for approval. 
Thus, the Planning Commission had no authority 
over this land as it was unzoned land. The County 
Commission was not powerless for under Section 17-
27-19 of the Utah Code, the Commission could without 
hearing prohibit construction on unzoned land for a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
period of not to exceed more than 6 months, but never 
did use the power granted to it by the legislature. The 
Plaintiff acknowledges that it is subject to the balance 
of the Mobile Home Ordinance. It is not, however, 
subject to the conditional use provision of that ordin-
ance or of the County Zoning Ordinance. 
The trial court did not err, but correctly found that 
this land was not subject to a conditoinal use permit. 
To hold otherwise would be in controvention of Sec-
tion 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
of the United States as was urged by the Plaintiff in 
both actions in its pleadings. The county cannot indi-
rectly avoid the legislative mandate as to how the uses 
of land might be regulated. It must create zones and 
districts and comply with that legislative mandate as 
required by Section 17-27-11. It never did so until 
August 24, 1973, and only at that date did the land in 
question come under the jurisdiction of the Planning 
Commission. The decision of the trial court should 
stand. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E ACTION TAKEN BY T H E BOARD O F 
C O U N T Y COMMISSIONERS ON AUGUST 9, 
1973, Z O N I N G R E S P O N D E N T ' S PROPERTY 
A-5 W A S A PROPER EXERCISE O F T H E 
STATE'S POLICE P O W E R A N D N O T S H O W N 
T O H A V E BEEN ARBITRARY OR UNREAS-
ONABLE, 
The County's contention that passing of the ordin-
ance invalidates the Plaintiff's argument that a condi-
tional use permit is not required is unacceptable. It is 
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an attempt by the County to gloss over the failure of 
administrative bodies to comply with the ordinances 
under which such administrative body claims to act. 
The Planning Commission did not act properly in set-
ting a re-hearing; it did not set forth reasons for rejec-
tion of Plaintiffs application although required to do 
so by the ordinance under which it acted; the Board of 
County Commissioners failed to act within 7 days after 
hearing of the appeal as required by Section 2 (6) of 
the County Zoning Ordinance which uses the manda-
tory term that the Commissioners ''shall make such de-
cision within seven (7) days of the hearing of the 
appeal/ ' Deseret Savings Bank v. Francis et alf 62 
Utah 85, 217 Pac. 1114, (1923). Time limitations in 
zoning matters are generally held to be jurisdictional in 
the State of Utah. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 
15 U. 2d 305, 392 P. 2d 40, 1964. Unlike the Price v. 
Schwafel case, supra, the County denied the appeal on 
August 8, 1973, and the next day, August 9, zoned the 
land in question. The prior activities and efforts by the 
Plaintiff were not washed out by this unusual action 
by the County, 
P O I N T V 
T H E L O W E R C O U R T DID N O T ERR IN 
ORDERING T H E DIRECTOR O F T H E SALT 
LAKE C O U N T Y BUILDING A N D Z O N I N G 
E N F O R C E M E N T D E P A R T M E N T T O ISSUE 
A BUILDING PERMIT T O R E S P O N D E N T 
The issuing of a building permit as required by the 
Lower Court would not do away with the necessity of 
the Plaintiff complying with the building and licensing 
aspects of the Mobile Home Park Ordinance. How-
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ever, the issuance of such a permit would allow the 
Plaintiff to commence its project and take the land out 
of limbo where it has been for a number of months at 
great expense to the Plaintiff with all the attendant 
rising prices, rising interest rates, and all the problems 
associated with our modern-day society and particular-
ly the inflationary pressures now present 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the Lower Court be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BELL & BELL, by 
J. Richard Bell 
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